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EFFECTIVE CONSENT TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The fourth amendment, by providing that there shall be no unreason-
able searches and that no warrant shall issue but on probable cause,1 guar-
antees that some sphere of an individual's privacy will be kept free from an
invasion by police officers.m 2 Since the amendment is for the individual's
own protection, once he effectively consents to a search the resultant in-
vasion of his privacy is not unconstitutional. A "consent," then, is a legal
term representing the conclusion that an individual has waived his fourth
amendment right.
Traditionally, courts have closely scrutinized situations where in-
dividuals have allegedly waived their constitutional rights. In Johnson v.
Zerbst,3 a waiver of counsel case, the Supreme Court stated:
It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights
and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of funda-
mental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.4
The clear implication of this expression is that not every instance in which
an individual has permitted a search will be held by the courts to have
been an effective waiver of his constitutional rights. Therefore, it becomes
necessary to designate some characteristics of the consensual situation to
provide a basis for determining which consents are to be regarded as effec-
tively waiving the fourth amendment protection.
I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Effective Consent
"Consent" cannot be determined merely by reference to the customary
implications of the word. It is unrealistic to assert that the giving of con-
sent means that the consenter "wants" the officer to conduct a search of his
premises, for few people would affirmatively desire, in an absolute sense,
to have a policeman looking through their property.5 Similarly, it is not
I U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 See generally Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946) (Franfldurter,
J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841) (construing
Massachusetts Bill of Rights) ; 10 ADAMS WORKS 247-48 (description of James Otis'
speech on writs of assistance) ; Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 55 JOHNs HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL STUDIES 211 (1937).
3304 U.S. 458 (1938).
41 Id. at 464.
5 Cf. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951) : "true consent,
free of fear or pressure, is not so readily to be found."
(260)
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enough to ask whether, in consenting, an individual "chooses" to have a
search, for even preference for a search over exposure to a policeman's
nightstick represents some form of choice. Clearly, then, a ruling that a
particular consent is or is not an effective waiver of a constitutional protec-
tion involves a judicial determination that the reasons why the individual
chose to allow a search were either acceptable or unacceptable. Under this
approach the courts should focus upon that which the individual obtains in
exchange for his consent.
There is no ready yardstick by which one can measure the acceptability
of the reasons for an individual's choosing to acquiesce in a search. The
courts are forced into the supervisory role of ensuring some minimal
amount of integrity to the choice-making of individuals who purport to sur-
render their constitutional protections. Whether a particular reason for
a consent is held to be unacceptable will therefore reflect the court's con-
ception of the range of choice to which an individual is entitled before
waiving his fourth amendment rights.
B. The Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court has adopted a rule excluding from trial certain
evidence obtained by police officers to safeguard individuals' fourth amend-
ment rights. 6 The most widely accepted rationale for this rule has been its
deterrence of undesirable police conduct 7-more specifically, that conduct
which is thought most likely to imperil individuals' constitutional rights.
Strictly applying this rationale, if police conduct in a particular case is not
thought likely to lead to ineffective consents, the evidence would not be
excluded, even if the defendant's consent was in fact ineffective. Cor-
respondingly, evidence would be excluded when police conduct is highly
likely to induce ineffective consents, even though the consent in the par-
ticular case was effective.
The rule which would provide maximum deterrence of searches fol-
lowing ineffective consents would be one which excludes all evidence stem-
6 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Supreme Court applied
the exclusionary rule to the states through Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964),
for an application of the exclusionary rule by the Court in a state consent to search
case.
7 See Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 6, at 656; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
217 (1960) ; Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v.
United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 552 (1964).
Another rationale for the rule is that it is a violation of a defendant's right against
self-incrimination to use against him evidence seized in violation of the Constitution.
See Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 6, at 661 (opinion of Black, J.). This rationale is
criticized in Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional De-
cision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. R v. 650, 664-68 (1962).
An earlier rationale for the rule was to keep tainted material out of the courts.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 485 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ; id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This rationale is criticized in Am-
sterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
389 n.49 (1964).
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ming from searches made without a valid warrant.8 The police conduct
required by such a rule is clear, and if obeyed, there would be no searches
in violation of the fourth amendment. However, the cost of such a rule
would be great. Search warrants would have to be obtained in cases where
the suspect would prefer an immediate search to the possibility of a future
search under a warrant. A search in such cases would not violate the
constitutional requirements and would be advantageous to both the suspect
and the police. Under a no-consent rule, the law-abiding officer would
either get a search warrant or continue to investigate the suspect in other
ways, which could involve considerable annoyance and inconvenience to
the suspect, his friends, and acquaintances. However, if the search could
take place immediately, the policeman might be sufficiently convinced of
the suspect's innocence to forestall further investigation, and, by eliminating
one suspect, the police would be able to move closer to the solution of the
crime. Furthermore, similar considerations are operative even where there
is incriminating evidence, for the suspect may still have acceptable reasons
for allowing a search; but the above rule would have the effect of eliminat-
ing such searches.
An exclusionary rule should be adopted which achieves the optimum
balance between deterrence of constitutional deprivations and social costs
incurred.9 Therefore, the rule for determining effective consents to search
should produce a sufficient deterrence of official conduct which induces
unacceptable waivers of fourth amendment rights and at the same time
retain as much as possible the advantages of allowing individuals to con-
sent to a search.
II. CONSENTS TO SEARCHE
A. Coerced Consents
The generic term describing a great number of situations in which
consents are given for unacceptable reasons is that the consent was
"coerced." 10 A flagrant example is when the police induce in the suspect
a fear of physical harm if consent is not given. This type of choice is
sharply contrasted to that given in exchange for some hoped-for advantages
in future relations with the police. For instance, an effective consent may
be given even when the the suspect knows that incriminating evidence will
be found. The suspect may believe that the evidence will undoubtedly be
found at a future time-for example, where a large still is located in the
suspect's cellar-and he may therefore wish to make the best of his
embarassment by an attitude of cooperation.
It is apparent that the latter type of choice is far less appropriate as an
object of judicial concern than is the former. However, these two choices
s Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954), approaches this position.
9 An exclusionary rule is a "medicament" of which "no more should be swallowed
than is needed to combat the disease." Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 389.
10 See, e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
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illustrate the spectrum within which the courts must operate in handling
the problem of coercion. Once it is decided that a particular type of choice
is unacceptable, the task becomes one of formulating rules which will re-
duce the possibility that suspects will choose a search for such reasons.
Unfortunately, the courts have tended to be preoccupied with the ex-
igencies of the cases 11 before them and have been less than articulate in
resolving the broader issues of whether and why particular choices are un-
acceptable waivers of constitutional rights.
Courts have taken two approaches in attempting to minimize the num-
ber of coerced consents. Under the first, the court attempts to determine
whether the suspect's consent to a search was in fact uncoerced. This sub-
jective approach can be characterized as a post hoc effort to reconstruct
the suspect's state of mind at the time the consent was given. 12 The second
approach is objective in that it requires a determination of whether the
police have acted in a way which would probably coerce an average person
in the suspect's apparent position. Under this approach, it is the police
conduct rather than the suspect's mental state which is the focus of judicial
attention.
While these approaches would not seem to provide an appreciably
different deterrent effect on police officers,' 3 the objective approach is never-
theless preferable. Under the subjective approach, the factual issue of
whether the suspect's consent was actually coerced must be litigated in
every case. Under the objective approach, a court need only measure the
police conduct in a particular case against the standard of conduct which
already has been determined to be likely to coerce an average suspect.
The objective approach would not only ameliorate a trial court's
difficulties in deciding cases, but would also increase the extent of appellate
review. Thus, if a trial court has decided that a particular defendant's
consent was not coerced, it is difficult for an appellate court to find this
factual determination erroneous. On the other hand, if a trial court finds
that an officer has acted in a particular way and then finds that this conduct
was not the type which would be likely to coerce an average suspect, the
appellate court can evaluate as a matter of law whether or not the officer's
conduct was the kind which should be deterred. 14
11 Courts often iterate that each consent to search case must be decided on its
own particular facts. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 306 (9th Cir.
1964) ; United States v. Zeimer, 291 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 877 (1961).
12See Application of Tomich, 221 F. Supp. 500 (D. Mont. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d
987 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Gregory, 204 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
13 If consents are invalidated only when the court believes that they were actually
coerced, officers would tend to act in a way which would not coerce the suspect at
hand. This conduct would probably be that which would not coerce an average person
in the suspect's position. Thus both the subjective and objective approaches would
tend to deter officers from the same kind of conduct.
14 Where constitutional rights are involved, it is particularly appropriate for
the appellate courts to assert control over the trial court. The appellate courts are
removed from the passions of the trial and are therefore better able to administer
the exclusionary rules objectively in litigated cases.
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1. Facts Warranting a Finding of Coercion
Catalanotte v. United States 15 presents a striking illustration of the
kinds of facts which operate to deprive the suspect of any meaningful choice.
Eleven officers came to the suspect's house at night. Five armed officers
went to the door, entered the house, and, in the presence of the suspect's
wife and paralyzed daughter, asked the suspect whether he had any
narcotics in the house. The officers then physically restrained the suspect
while he was revealing the contents of his pockets, and shortly after this
the suspect told the officers, "The house is yours." The court held the
consent ineffective. The number of officers, their aggressive manner, the
time of night, and the presence of the suspect's dependents all testify to the
high probability of intimidation.'1
In United States v. Arrington,17 the court invalidated a consent to
search given by a suspect who was under arrest and in jail with no charge
against him. In this situation it is probable that the suspect's isolation
will induce considerable fear and uncertainty which might lead him to
choose a search in order to avoid unseen dangers. It seems justifiable
under such circumstances to hold that the suspect chose to allow the
search for unacceptable reasons.
Of course a suspect in jail might choose to allow a search because of
a hope that it would lead to his exculpation, and such a reason seems to be
an acceptable one. This possibility is discounted somewhat by the likelihood
that a suspect aware of the prospects of exculpation would be likely to
request a search before being jailed. In fact even if suspects in jail choose
searches for such an acceptable reason the potential danger that many of
them would do so for unacceptable reasons is of sufficient magnitude to
justify a rule that a suspect in jail cannot consent to a search.'8
In Farris v. United States,19 an officer first announced to the suspect
that he was going to conduct a search, and the suspect then consented. The
officer's forceful manner seemed to leave the suspect with no real alternative
15 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953).
16 See United States v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (consent
invalid when given after agents entered suspect's house at night and confronted him
in front of his family) ; United States v. Marguette, 271 Fed. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1920),
aff'd, 271 Fed. 214 (9th Cir. 1921) (consent invalid when given after officers came
to door armed with shotguns demanding admission). But see Martinez v. United
States, 333 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1964) (consent persistently sought in the presence of
suspect's unnerved wife held valid) ; United States v. Martin, 176 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959) (consent valid when given after three officers approached suspect in the
daytime at his place of business).
17215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1954).
18 See Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960) (suspect in custody
of federal officers) ; Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (suspect
in jail under police interrogation). A consent following a valid arrest has also been
held ineffective. See Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Gregory v.
United States, 204 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). But see Gendron v. United States,
227 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Mo. 1964); United States v. Klaw, 227 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.
N.Y. 1964).
19 See Farris v. United States, 24 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1928).
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but to choose a search. It is highly improbable that an average suspect
would assert his opposition to a search which, to all appearances, was in-
evitable. The court was therefore correct in holding this consent
ineffective 20
In Takahashi v. United States,2 1 the court invalidated a consent given
to an officer by a Japanese-American during World War II. This suspect
was manifestly of a class that would be likely to follow police suggestions
because of fear. In such a case even routine police conduct would have a
high probability of coercing a consent; therefore, a court would be justified
in invalidating almost any consent to a search.
22
2. Facts Waranting a Finding of Noncoercion
In Honig v. United States,23 one federal agent and two police officers
went to the suspect's room. After being invited to enter, the officers in-
formed the suspect of the complaint against him and asked him for iden-
tification. When he answered that he had none, the officers asked if he
would mind if they searched the room for identification, and he told them to
proceed. The court held this to be an effective consent. In this situation
the officers' actions seemed sufficiently polite and unobtrusive to render it
unlikely that the average man in the suspect's position would be choosing
a search for unacceptable reasons.
In other cases courts have asserted that a consent to search is effective
because a suspect has rendered affirmative assistance to a police officer.2
Under the objective approach, a suspect's affirmative assistance should be
crucial only if it occurs before the police officer takes any action which
might be considered undesirable.2 5  If the suspect takes the initiative in
allowing a search, it is very likely that acceptable reasons have led him
to choose to allow the search.
20 See United States v. Slusser, 270 Fed. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1921) ; cf. Lee v. United
States, 232 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (consent invalid when obtained after uninvited
officer walked through open door). Compare McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d
272 (10th Cir. 1962) (consent valid when obtained after officers told arrested suspect
they were going to conduct a search and asked him if he had any objections).
21143 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1944).
22 See Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1531) (burden of proving
an effective consent heavier when the suspect does not readily speak or understand
English); United States v. Wai Lau, 215 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (consent
invalid when given by suspect unable to speak English with any facility).
23208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953).
24 See United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir'. 1962) (dictum), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963) ; United States v. MacLeod, 207 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir.
1953) (dictum).
In Smith the suspect was validly arrested and narcotics found in her possession.
The police then asked her if she had more narcotics; she answered affirmatively and
showed the police where they were located. This was held to be an effective consent.
In MacLeod consent was held valid when, after some incriminating evidence was
obtained, the suspect opened a chest for the police and brought them a printing press.
25 Where a suspect affirmatively helps the policeman after the policeman has acted
in a coercive manner, the evidence should be excluded to deter such conduct even
if the consent was not coerced. See text following note 7 supra.
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3. The Middleground-Police Persistence
In United States v. Ziemer,2 6 when two officers came to the suspect's
apartment door and told him they were looking for a stolen suit of clothes,
he became very nervous. One of the officers asked the suspect whether
he would allow him to enter, and the suspect answered, "I would rather
not." The officers persisted, telling the suspect that if he did not possess
the clothing he would have nothing to hide. The court held the suspect's
subsequent allowance of a search to be an effective consent.
In Pekar v. United States,27 federal agents came to the suspect's
apartment and told him they wanted to talk with him. After a ten minute
silence, the agents repeated their request. At the suspect's request, the
agents shoved some identification under the door. Finally, the suspect
opened the door, and the agents, upon entering, saw some luggage. When
they asked the suspect's permission to inspect the luggage and search the
room, the suspect said he did not mind. Upon finding incriminating evi-
dence, the officers asked the suspect to sign a waiver of search warrant
form, but he refused.28 The court held the consent to search invalid.
In both of the above cases the suspect at first declined to allow a
search, but, after some persistence on the part of the officer, changed his
mind. There are at least two possibilities to account for such behavior.
The suspect may believe that the officer will not leave until he does con-
sent.29 Alternatively, the suspect might merely have changed his mind
about the search's desirability. The former seems an unacceptable reason
for waiving one's rights, while the latter seems unobjectionable.
A court's decision as to whether officer persistence should be deterred
should be grounded on the likelihood that this persistence will lead sus-
pects to allow searches because they believe the officer will not leave until
they do so. The court should make a value judgment as to whether this
likelihood is sufficiently high to warrant deterrence of police persistency.
A decision in favor of deterrence should be embodied in a rule that
effective consent cannot be given once a suspect has refused to allow a
search.30
26291 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
27315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1963).
28The court partially based its holding on the suspect's refusal to sign the
waiver. Id. at 325. However, since the objective approach focuses only on the
officer's conduct before a consent to search is given, this factor should be relevant
only to whether the officer was telling the truth. Compare note 25 supra.
29 Compare Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1964) (consent
valid although obtained after being persistently sought in the presence of the suspect's
wife who was becoming upset).
30 A similar kind of assessment should be made in other difficult consent to search
cases. Compare United States v. McCarthy, 297 F.2d 183 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 850 (1962) (consent to be fingerprinted valid although given after federal officer
warned suspect that if he did not do so the city police would probably take him into
custody), with United States v. Baldocci, 42 F.2d 567 (S.D. Cal. 1930) (consent
invalid when obtained after officer told suspect he would obtain a search warrant if
the suspect did not consent to a search).
[Vo1.113:260
1964] EFFECTIVE CONSENT TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE 267
In Ziemer and Pekar, instead of promulgating broad rules, the courts
apparently plunged into the particular facts of each case.31 When an
exclusionary rule is involved, however, the promulgation of broad and
clear rules in order to minimize uncertainty for police officers is especially
appropriate. An exclusionary rule will produce the optimal deterrent
effect if the rule is clear enough that the officer will know precisely
when evidence he obtains will be excluded. If the rule is unclear, a
policeman will have no firm guidelines and will be more likely either to
indulge in undesirable conduct on the one hand or refrain from desirable
conduct on the other.
32
B. Shortcomings of the Current Tests
1. The Problem of Knowing Waiver
When a suspect allows a search, while confronted only with relatively
mild police conduct, his choice would seem to be made for acceptable
reasons. However, there are many cases of reportedly innocuous police
conduct in which the suspect allowed a search which seems to be obvi-
ously contrary to his interests 33  In United States v. Gregory,34 the court
made the following observation: "[T]he alleged consent under the facts
and circumstances here presented-a defendant at once denying that nar-
cotics are in his room and at the same time agreeing to a search which
obviously must yield narcotics-is not in accord with common experi-
ence." 35 Since the situation described in Gregory seems to arise fre-
quently,30 one can conclude only that a substantial number of suspects are
choosing searches for reasons not apparent from the reported facts.
One possibility is that some suspects allow searches merely because
they are ignorant of their right to refuse to allow them. Such a suspect
should not be held to have effectively waived his fourth amendment right.
37
There can be no "intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right" 
38
until a person knows that the right exists. This knowledge is essential
if the choice to permit a search is to be a meaningful one.
31Zienter states that each search and seizure case must be decided on the basis
of its own particular facts. 291 F.2d at 103.
32 See Blakey, supra note 7, at 552 n.379.
33 See, e.g., Honig v. United States, 208 F2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953) ; United States
v. MacLeod, 207 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1953).
34204 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 309 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1962).
35 Id. at 885. Compare Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405, 407 (9th Cir.
1964) (dictum); People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P.2d 245 (1956); People v.
West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 300 P.2d 729 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
36 See cases cited note 33 supra.
37 United States v. Roberts, 179 F. Supp. 478 (D.D.C. 1959). Many courts have
said that a consent to search must be intelligently given. See, e.g., United States v.
Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963);
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (dictum).
38Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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a. A Rule of Disclosure
In view of the above difficulties, police officers seeking consents to
search should be required to inform suspects of their right not to be
searched without a warrant. Thus, an officer might be required to say,
"You do not have to consent to a search of your house, and without your
permission, I cannot make any search without a search warrant."
In the analogous area of self-incrimination, the Supreme Court has
held that a suspect before a United States Commissioner need not be
warned that he has a right to remain silent.3 9 However, in United States
v. Scully,40 a circuit court advocated a warning requirement, but declined
to adopt it in the face of the adverse Supreme Court rulings. 41 Thus,
there is some judicial recognition of the need for a warning in the self-
incrimination area. There is an equally strong need for a warning in the
area of consent to search.
Whether a suspect can permanently prevent a search will depend
upon whether the officer can show facts constituting probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant. Therefore, a suspect cannot fully assess
the wisdom of allowing a search without knowing whether or not the
officer can otherwise obtain a warrant. It would seem but an extension
of the warning requirement to demand that the suspect also be informed
whether a warrant could be obtained. However, to preserve the fourth
amendment guarantee of privacy, it is necessary only to insure that one
surrendering this protection has a meaningful choice, not that he make
an optimal decision. Therefore, the officer should not be required to
inform the suspect of the likelihood that a search warrant wil be issued.
42
b. A No-Solicitation Rule.
Another possible rule would be the disallowance of any consent to
search which was solicited. Under this rule there could be no effective
consent whenever an officer asked for permission to search. Such a rule
would provide a significant fourth amendment safeguard and still retain the
essential advantages of a consent to search rule. It is unlikely that
an unsolicited individual would allow a search because he thought he lacked
an alternative. If a suspect requests a search, it would seem that he is
affirmatively choosing to allow one. 43  If he does not want to allow the
39 See Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912) ; Wilson v. United States,
162 U.S. 613 (1896). However, dictum in Wilson suggests that if the defendant can
prove that he did not know of his right to remain silent at the time he made a state-
ment in response to a question, then his statement cannot be admitted against him.
40225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
41 See cases cited note 39 supra.
42 Courts have divided on the question of whether an officer may volunteer this
information. See, e.g., United States v. Baldocci, 42 F.2d 567 (S.D. Cal. 1930) (con-
sent given after officer said he would get a search warrant if suspect refused held
invalid) ; Gatterdam v. United States, 5 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1925) (such facts held
immaterial).
43 Compare text accompanying notes 24-25 mipra.
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search, he has the obvious alternative of saying nothing about it until the
officer broaches the subject.
This rule would have the disadvantage of eliminating constitutionally
permissible searches in situations where suspects who would effectively
choose to allow a search would not venture to ask for one. However, this
disadvantage is lessened by the likelihood that suspects anxious to clear
themselves would request a search.
c. An Evaluation of the Proposed Rudes
Both of the proposed rules would provide clearer standards of police
conduct than do present consent rules. While a rule requiring a warn-
ing would leave a greater possibility of police coercion than would one
prohibiting solicitation," the former would be less likely to curtail searches
following choices made by suspects for acceptable reasons. Therefore, the
warning rule is preferable and should be tried initially. If it then appears
that officers are not effectively deterred from coercing suspects into giving
consents to search, the no-solicitation rule should replace it.
2. The Litigation Problem
Neither of the two proposed rules would overcome the inability of
the litigation process to uncover what actually transpired between the
suspect and the police officer. Since triers of fact tend to believe officers
rather than suspects, 45 an officer willing to perjure himself could violate
constitutional rights without imperiling evidence so obtained. The ques-
tioning of police officers by judges might be one means of meeting this
problem. If it is believed that the litigation process still could not effec-
tively expose the facts surrounding a consent, a rule would have to be
adopted rendering ineffective any consent to search.
47
III. CONSENT TO ENTRY
Police entry into a dwelling can be a form of search, but raises addi-
tion issues regarding effective consent. Problems involving the identity
either of the person seeking to invade another's privacy or of the person
consenting to such an invasion are more likely to arise in the entry context
44 With the first rule, the ordinary coercion rules could not be discarded; with
the second, they are no longer necessary.
45 See, e.g., United States v. De Vivo, 190 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1961);
United States v. Martin, 176 F. Supp. 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; State v. Marshall,
234 Ore. 183, 185, 380 P.2d 799, 800 (1963).
46This problem has been judicially recognized. See Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 574 (1961) (opinion of Frankdurter, J.) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143, 149-53 (1944).
47 Cf. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) ; McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb-Mallory rule excludes from evidence statements
made by defendants after they have been held in federal detention for more than a
reasonable period of time. One rationale is to preclude the necessity of litigating
what transpires in the detention room between the officers and the defendant. See id.
at 344: "[The rule] aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of
persons accused of crime."
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than in that of other types of searches. In the entry situation the individual
may extend a "come in" to an officer at his door without being aware that
it is an officer who wants to enter. Likewise, the officer may not know
the identity or the status of the individual who responds to his knock. On
the other hand, an occupant is not likely to grant permission to search to
an unidentified person, and, moreover, it is unlikely that anyone other
than a policeman would be requesting to search a dwelling.
People v. Dent 48 presented both identity problems. Two officers rang
the bell of the defendant's house and either the defendant or her woman
companion said, "Come in." The officers entered and immediately spied
incriminating evidence. The court held the consent to enter ineffective on
two grounds. First, it was not clear that the defendant had given her
consent to enter, and no third party could effectively waive her constitu-
tional rights.49 The alternative ground was that even if the defendant had
given permission to enter, the officers at the door were required to disclose
their identity.50
This first holding seems incorrect. If the purpose of an exclusionary
rule is deterrence of undesirable police conduct, the issue should not be
whether it was the defendant who consented, but rather, whether a police-
men who has been given permission to enter by an unidentified voice should
be required to ascertain the identity of the speaker.
In general courts have held that persons having a certain degree of
control over a dwelling can consent to an invasion of that dwelling.51
Under this rule, a woman permanently living in a house would be entitled
to consent to an entry, while a cleaning woman probably would not.
Therefore, if an officer entered a house upon the invitation of a person such
as a cleaning woman, he would be unconstitutionally infringing upon the
privacy of the house. However, a person such as a cleaning woman would
be unlikely to issue a general invitation to enter when she heard a knock
on the door. Therefore, if an officer acts upon such an invitation without
further inquiry, the chances that he would be infringing upon an individual's
constitutional rights would be slight.
Moreover, to require an officer to ask an unseen person what interest
he has in a house would seem quite impractical. The person might be
too confused by the question to give a meaningful answer. Even if this
were not the case, the officer might have considerable difficulty evaluating
the reply, necessitating a further series of confusing inquiries. Further-
more, if the officer asked about the person's interest in the house, he would
probably have to reveal that he was an officer.52  This might cause the
occupant either to conceal evidence or to deny entry.
48 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E.2d 1020 (1939).
49 Id. at 34, 19 N.E.2d at 1021.
50 Id. at 36, 19 N.E.2d at 1022.
51 See text accompanying notes 60-78 infra.
52 This discussion assumes that a policeman is not constitutionally required to
reveal his identity when he knocks on a suspect's door. For a discussion of this point,
see text accompanying notes 56-57 inf ra.
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On balance, the disadvantages of requiring an officer to inquire as to
the identity of a voice which consents to an entry outweigh the slight addi-
tional fourth amendment protection which would accompany such a rule.
The alternative holding in Dent, that an officer must identify himself
before there can be an effective consent to entry,5 can be profitably com-
pared to the holding in People v. Hodson.54 There the court invalidated a
consent to entry when a police officer had represented to the suspect that
he was the hotel manager. To justify these decisions, it must be maintained
that both entries obtained by deception and entries made upon a general
invitation are likely to lead to infringements of the fourth amendment right
of privacy.
When an individual allows a purported hotel manager to enter, he is
choosing only to allow a hotel manager, not a police officer, to invade his
privacy. There is no reason why an individual's fourth amendment rights
cannot include the right to keep areas of his privacy free from invasion by
particular classes of people, as well as from all invasions. The officer pur-
porting to be a hotel manager does not give the individual a chance to
effectively waive his right to exclude other classes of persons. Therefore,
the Hodson result seems justifiable.
An occupant who issues a general invitation may in fact have intended
the invitation for a specific person, such as an expected guest. In any
event he clearly would not be contemplating the possibility that he is
inviting a policeman to invade his privacy. However, this should not en-
title a defendant such as in Dent to the same protection as that given to the
defendant in Hodson. It was within the ability of the defendant in Dent to
asertain the identity of his caller, and an unmanifested intention to grant
a limited invasion of one's privacy should not be entitled to legal
recognition.
Moreover, the Johnson v. Zerbst 55 requirement of an intelligent waiver
has no application here. The reason for furnishing a suspect with knowl-
edge of his legal right to exclude, through the proposed rule of warning,
is to provide the suspect with the basis for a meaningful choiceY6 The fact
that the defendant in Dent bad no knowledge that a policeman was knocking
does not import a lack of acceptable basis for choice. The fact that a caller
knocks indicates his intent to comply with the desires of the inhabitant.
The defendant's knowledge that he could exclude the caller should satisfy
the constitutional requirement of a "knowing waiver."
Supreme Court decisions in related areas of criminal procedure justify
distinguishing cases such as Hodson from those such as Dent. Gouled v.
3 But see Simmons v. Bomar, 230 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
54 37 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). The suspect opened the door to admit
the "hotel manager" and later consented to a search. The court held the consent
to search invalid because of the "improper" entry. However, the discussion here
assumes the opening of the door to have been a consent to entry. But cf. Chieftain
Pontiac Corp. v. Julian, 209 F.2d 657 (1st Cir. 1954) (dictum) (consent to search
after a fraudulent misrepresentation held valid).
65 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
56 See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
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United States 57 established the rule that evidence obtained after entry by
trick or stealth is inadmissible. In On Lee v. United States,5 an old
acquaintance of the defendant who had become a police officer entered
the suspect's laundry and, without revealing his new occupation, engaged
the suspect in conversation. The Court held admissible incriminating
statements made by defendant and recorded through a microphone con-
cealed on the agent's person. In Lopes v. United States,59 the defendant
invited a revenue agent to meet with him, suggesting that he would offer a
bribe. The agent kept the appointment and did not tell the defendant that
he had no interest in a bribe. The Court held admissible statements
recorded by the agent during his discussion with the defendant. In Gouled
the officers obtained evidence through affirmative deceit. In On Lee and
Lopez the officers did not use such deceit to help them obtain evidence; but
neither did they voluntarily explain to the suspects their intentions, al-
though had they done so, the suspects undoubtedly would not have con-
versed so freely. Thus the Court seems to exclude evidence obtained by
an officer's affirmatively deceitful action, but admits evidence that is ob-
tained by an officer who does not volunteer facts to a suspect.
IV. THIRD PARTY CONSENT TO A SEARCH
A. Searches of Dwellings
1. The Constitutional Foundation
In Stoner v. California,6 0 a hotel clerk allowed the police to search
a guest's room. In holding that the clerk could not consent to this search,
the Supreme Court stated: "It is important to bear in mind that it was.
the petitioner's constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the
night clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right, therefore, which only the
petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an
agent." 61 This statement implies that the fourth amendment right to be
secure in the home guarantees that no evidence in a dwelling can be constitu-
tionally seized unless either the person against whom the evidence is to be
used, or someone to whom he has delegated authority to consent to a search,.
chooses to allow the search. 2 A suspect would in practice rarely make an
express delegation of authority to a third party to consent to a search which
57 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Goided was limited to its facts by Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928).
58343 U.S. 747 (1952).
59 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
60 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
61 Id. at 489.
62 For an example of this approach, see Kelley v. State, 184 Tenn. 143, 197
S.W.2d 545 (1946), in which the court disallowed a wife's consent to a search of
her husband's house because she was angry with him at the time and, therefore, could
not then have been acting as his agent.
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would be likely to reveal incriminating evidence. Therefore, Stoner's ap-
proach would allow third party consents only through use of the fiction
that the third party had been given implied authority to consent.
63
At the time of passage of the fourth amendment, the chief evil our
founders were seeking to remedy was the uninvited intrusions into private
houses by customs officials.64 The amendment was adopted to restrain
these officials from invading "homes, papers, and personal effects" with only
a general warrant or with no warrant at all. 65  "Papers and personal
effects" connote belongings which are the exclusive property of one in-
dividual, thus seeming to insure protection of a personal sphere of privacy.
On the other hand, a dwelling can be a "home" to several people. There-
fore, "secure in their homes" would seem to have been devised to protect
a property right. If so, any person having sufficient control over the prop-
erty should be able to decide whether or not the property right should be
waived. Therefore, despite the Stoner dictum, any person having a suffi-
cient level of control over a dwelling should be able to consent to a search
of it.
2. The Test of Control
Courts applying the control test generally find that the third party
can consent if he has, in a practical sense, free access to the dwelling and
substantial freedom to do what he wishes within the dwelling.66 Three
typical situations in which this test is appropriate are when a wife consents
to a search which tends to incriminate her husband, when a landlord con-
sents to a search which tends to incriminate his tenant, and when an em-
ployee consents to a search which tends to incriminate his employer.
In U-Aited States z. Sergio,67 federal agents, smelling fermenting mash
coming from a house in a residential area, knocked at the door. The de-
fendant's wife, on answering, was told by the agents of their knowledge of
the still's existence and was asked about the smell. She denied knowledge,
but said that they were welcome to search the house. The court held this
consent effective. Because the wife had complete freedom with respect to
63 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964), in which the
court held admissible evidence obtained after officers were granted entry into the
defendant's house by an eight year old girl. The court said: "From all the evidence
before it, the trial court was entitled to conclude that her opening the door and
invitation to enter were not . . . unauthorized acts." Id. at 303.
64 See Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, 55 JoHNs HopKiNs UNIvERsrrY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL
AND PoTrrIcA STUDIES 211, 261-88 (1937).
65 See id. at 289-315.
66 Of course, the third party should be of sufficient mentality and maturity to be
able to know what he is doing when he consents to a search. See Gilliland v. Com-
monwealth, 224 Ky. 453, 6 S.W.2d 467 (1928) (evidence inadmissible against two
sons when consent given by senile father). But see Davis v. United States, 327
F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964) (evidence admissible where obtained by officers allowed to
enter house by defendant's eight year old daughter).
6721 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
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the premises and was at the time in charge of the premises, the court's
decision is clearly correct.""
In Stein v. United States,'" defendant and a woman were living to-
gether as if man and wife. A home was purchased with the defendant's
money, but title was taken in the names of both defendant and his mistress.
Subsequently, they had a violent disagreement, and both left the house to
live with separate friends, but the defendant retained the key. His mistress
later consented to a search of the house. The court held this consent
valid on the ground that the joint ownership of the house gave her sufficient
control over it to extend the invitation.
In this case the woman had left the house, had no immediate means of
reentering it, and was clearly antagonistic towards the man with whom she
had been living. All these facts would tend to make it appear to an officer
that she lacked sufficient control over the house to consent to a search. On
the other hand, if the officer knew that the woman had joint title to the
house,70 he would be aware that she had a legal right to return thereto.
This alone does not justify the court's decision, because the woman's bare
legal right did not give her control over the house in any practical sense.
71
However, if the officer also knew that the defendant had left the house,7
this would tend to justify the court's holding. Control over a dwelling is
not a concept measurable in absolute terms. A person with little control
over a dwelling should not be allowed to consent to a search of it where
another person has a high degree of control. However, when no one has
a high degree of control over a dwelling, a person with little control should
be able to consent to a search. Relative to the other interests in the
dwelling, his degree of control is significant. 73  In Stein the woman ap-
parently had a small degree of control over the dwelling, while the man's
control was slightly greater. Whether this woman had sufficient relative
68 Accord, Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964) ; United States
v. Heine, 149 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 (1945).
Contra, United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920). Compare Jones
v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 358, 177 P.2d 148 (1946) (husband's consent binds wife).
69 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948).
7o There is no indication whether or not the officers were cognizant of this fact.
71 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) :
[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle
distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body
of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law,
has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.
72 There is similarly no indication whether or not the officers were cognizant
of this fact.
7
3This rationale satisfactorily explains some cases which are difficult to justify
under any other third party consent to search theory. See Cutting v. United States,
169 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1948) (consent to search by neighbor valid where defendant
resided in another part of city) ; Reszutek v. United States, 147 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.
1945) (superintendent of house can validly consent to search of it when material in
it tended to incriminate the house owner who did not have a possessory interest in
the house). Compare Idol v. State, 223 Ind. 307, 119 N.E2d 428 (1954) (super-
intendent cannot give valid consent to search of fraternity garage where defendant
kept his car).
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control over the dwelling to consent to a search poses such a close question
that the court's determination is neither untenable nor clearly correct.
In Chapman v. United States,74 a landlord smelled mash at the prem-
ises of a tenant. He called the police, and together they forced their way
into tlie dwelling. The Supreme Court held that even though the landlord
was entitled under state law to enter for the purpose of viewing waste, he
could not enter with police officers for the purpose of conducting a search.75
In Woodard v. United States,76 an elderly lady took her grand-nephew
and another boy into her house as nonpaying boarders. While cleaning
their room, she saw some incriminating evidence and called the police. The
lady was held to be able to consent to a search.77 Unlike the landlord in
Chapman, this woman manifestly had free access to the boys' room. There-
fore, both Chap"mn and Woodard would seem to have been correctly
decided.
78
In People v. Carswell,7 9 the police knocked at the suspect's door and
were admitted by a man who was painting the premises. The court held
that the painter could not effectively consent to the search. In People v.
Misquez,80 the defendant and his mistress were in police custody. The
babysitter for the defendant's children was also at the police station. A
police officer obtained access to their apartment by inducing the babysitter
to give him a key. The court held that the babysitter could consent to a
search. Unlike the painter, the babysitter, by virtue of her posession of a
key, would seem to the police to have substantial freedom to enter and leave
the apartment as she pleased. Therefore, both the Carswell and Misquez
decisions are justifiable.
B. The Individual's Personal Privacy
That part of the fourth amendment provision specifying that in-
dividuals should be "secure in their . . . papers and personal effects"
seems to define an area of personal privacy peculiar to the individual, which
should not be invaded by an officer without a warrant unless the individual
personally consents.
In Bielicki v. Superior Court,8' the owner of an amusement park au-
thorized police to install a pipe which would enable them to see any homo-
sexual activity taking place in two pay toilets. The court held the consent
of the park owner ineffective on the ground that the person occupying the
74365 U.S. 610 (1961).
75 Id. at 616 (alternative holding).
76254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958).
77 But see Burge v. United States, 333 F2d 210 (9th Cir. 1964) (occupant of an
apartment can not consent to a search which will tend to incriminate a guest staying
in her apartment).
78 See also Driskill v. United States, 281 Fed. 146 (9th Cir. 1922) (lessee can
consent to search of garage when lessor has right to store his things in the garage).
79 149 Cal. App. 2d 395, 308 P.2d 852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
SO 152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 131 P.2d 206 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
81157 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
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stall had a personal right of privacy.8 2 In Blok v. United States,8 3 defend-
ant's official supervisor consented to a search of a desk which was Govern-
ment property assigned to the defendant. In holding the consent to search
invalid, the court said that the supervisor could have looked for a pair of
scissors in the desk, but could not consent to have policemen look therein
for stolen property.8 4 Bielicki indicates that an individual's area of personal
privacy is that which he would reasonably expect to be left undisturbed by
others. Blok shows that an area may be nonprivate with respect to some
infringements, but still private with respect to others.
An individual may by his actions relinquish his fourth amendment
protection over his personal belongings. In Sartain v. United States,8 5
the suspect delivered his brief case together with a key to a friend who
turned them over to the police. The court held the friend's consent to the
search valid because he had full access to the bag. In Eldridge v. United
States,8 6 the suspect lent his car to a friend. After the friend consented to
a search of the car, incriminating evidence was found in the trunk. In
holding that the friend's consent to the search was effective, the court
emphasized that at the time of the consent, the friend was using the car
as his own.
8 7
In both of these cases, the suspect gave a third party complete freedom
to use his personal belongings. Under such circumstances the suspect
seems affirmatively to be taking the risk that the third party will show
his personal belongings to others. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that in these cases the suspect has impliedly given the third party
authority to waive his own personal right of privacy. 88
A more difficult problem is posed when a suspect puts his personal
effects in a container and leaves the container on the property of a third
party. In Holzhey v. United States,89 the suspect's daughter and son-in-
law gave the police permission to search their premises. When the police
approached a locked cabinet, the daughter and son-in-law made statements
which should have alerted the police to the possibility that the cabinet did
not belong to them. Nevertheless, the police searched the cabinet. The
82 Compare Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1962) (evidence inadmissible when police observe homosexual activities in
closed stall of nonpay toilets through pipe already installed) ; People v. Norton, 209
Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (evidence admissible when
observed in open stall by officers peering through holes in urinal across from the
stall). See generally Comment, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 955 (1963).
83188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
84 Id. at 1021. Contra, United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1944)
(dictum).
85 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962).
86 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
87 Id. at 466. The dissent stressed the brief period for which the third party was
to use the car and the limited purpose for which he could use it. Id. at 467. How-
ever, in terms of effective police deterrence, the situation as it would appear at the
time of the consent would be the crucial issue. At that time, the third party obviously
had effective control of the car.
88 Compare text accompanying note 62 supra.
89 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955).
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court held the third party consent invalid because the police had a duty at
least to inquire whether or not an individual's personal effects were being
invaded.
In United States v. Rees,90 police officers received permission from
the suspect's mother and father to search their house. In a crawl space
they found what seemed to be a suit case tagged with the name and phone
number of Dennis J. Werber, a third party. Defendant's father gave per-
mission to open the suitcase. The court held the father's consent effective.91
It seems difficult to distinguish validly this case from Hoishey. Appear-
ances were that the bag belonged exclusively to Dennis J. Werber. There-
fore, because Werber was not asked whether the bag could be opened, the
evidence taken from the bag should have been excluded from trial.
The Rees case aptly demonstrates that to deter effectively police
conduct which may lead to fourth amendment violations, evidence con-
stitutionally obtained may have to be excluded. After the police opened
the bag, they questioned Dennis J. Werber. From the answers he gave,
it seemed that the bag was his, and that he would have consented to an
original search of it.9 2 Nevertheless, the evidence obtained from the bag
should have been excluded to deter policemen from opening private bags
before obtaining permission from a person in Werber's position.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern criminal process has in many contexts recognized that a rea-
sonable safeguard against the blunder of the constable is freedom for the
individual whose rights have been invaded. This attitude similarly should
be embodied in concrete rules of law which will deter police conduct leading
to consents to waive fourth amendment rights given either for unacceptable
reasons or by unacceptable individuals.
Welsh S. White
90193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961).
91 Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); United States v. Minker,
312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963); Burton v. United
States, 272 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960). In these
cases searches were permitted because the suspect had abandoned the evidence.
92 193 F. Supp. at 853.
